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Values in the European Union's foreign policy: an analysis and assessment of CFSP 
Declarations 
Paul James Cardwell* 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Declarations have become one of the main ways 
in which the EU makes its voice heard on the global stage. Declarations do not have a basis 
in the Treaty but are the product of close cooperation between the Member States. Their 
frequency has increased to the extent that they are a stable, regular and institutionalized 
feature of the CFSP. When placed in ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ
arrangements, Declarations can be understood as an integral part of the progress of forging 
a common foreign policy for the EU and they should not merely be regarded as empty words. 
In particular, Declarations represent a significant delegation of authority for the High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy to speak for Europe. This article examines the 
scope and content of the CFSP Declarations issued over the period 2007-2015 by the Council 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. By 
classifying Declarations according to type,  ?target ? and subject matter, the article suggests 
that Declarations have become a specific instrument in their own right and reflect a core set 
of values the EU has pursued via the CFSP.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty on European 
Union in 1992 was  W for those convinced that the time had come for Europe to gain a foreign 
policy voice consummate with its economic strength  W the pivotal moment in the 
development of a formal, institutional framework to operationalize foreign policy. However, 
the CFSP has traditionally been regarded as falling short of expectations (even those which it 
set for itself),
1
 ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŽƌǇ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƵƐĞĚĂƐĂ ůĂďĞůǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ŝƐ
ƵŶĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ĂƐ ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐŶƚƐ  ‘ůŽǁĞƐƚ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ
denominator ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?.2 Much of the criticism stems from expectations that the EU would act 
in a similar way to a nation state, rather than as a sui generis actor,
3
 and that its emphasis on 
ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĚŽĞƐůŝƚƚůĞƚŽĚĂŵƉĞŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?4 But in turn this led to a lack of 
focus on what the EU does say, and what this reveals about the CFSP, its institutional 
ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐĂŶĚ ?ĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞh ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞƐŝƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐ ? 
Declarations have become the most regular means by which the EU has made its 
voice heard. They are not, however,  ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ&^W W as defined in Articles 
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 Most notably, by C. Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or ConceptualizŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Role, 31(3) J. Com. Mkt. Stud., 305-328 (1993). 
2
 B. Tonra, Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 41(4) J. Com. Mkt. Stud., 731-56 
(2003). 
3
 See, for example, P. Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law, 34 (Hart 
Publishing, 2001). 
4
 K. L. Nielsen, EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap, 9(5) J. Contemp. European 
Research, 723-739 (2013).  
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23-41 TEU  W and are in fact not even mentioned in the Treaty.5 They have emerged over a 
long period of time, from when the EU first began to seek a foreign policy identity in the 
1970s (via European Political Cooperation), and represent an institutionalized form of 
cooperation between the Member States.
6
 Declarations therefore have no formal legal 
effects but are a ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?
Since an official position can only arise from cooperation and agreement between the 
Member States, Declarations offer a rich insight into the emerging foreign policy of the 
Union and the values the EU seeks to promote. 
In terms of values, and why the EU seeks to use Declarations to promote them, the 
Treaty arrangements of the EU give some guidance as to their content. Article 2 TEU
7
 lists 
the values upon which the EU is founded, and Article 3(5) TEU
8
 links these to the general 
objectives of the EU in engaging with the rest of the world. The text of the Treaty is 
therefore reasonably instructive in terms of the broad spectrum of values which the EU is 
ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ‘ƐŚĂůůƵƉŚŽůĚĂŶĚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ? ? ?ǁŚŝůƐƚůĞĂǀŝŶŐĂƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŚĞůĚĚĞĂƌ ?
such as opposition to the death penalty. 
This article analyses the Declarations issued by the EU during a nine-year period, 
2007-2015. 2007 is the start date for the analysis as the gradual practice of primarily using 
Declarations to signify a text which has been agreed by the Member States was more firmly 
established. After a brief examination of how Declarations are agreed and issued and their 
general characteristics, the methodology of categorizing the Declarations for analysis is 
explained. Three main findings emerge from an analysis of the Declarations according to 
type,  ‘target ? and subject-matter. These are that, first, Declarations have developed into a 
specific instrument of the CFSP in their own right; second, that the ability of the High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP)
9
 to represent the EU has increased 
over time, and third that they demonstrate the EU has refined the core set of values set out 
in the Treaties it expresses via the CFSP. 
2. CFSP DECLARATIONS: THE PROCESSES 
Article 25 (a)-(c) TEU lays ĚŽǁŶƚŚĞŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ&^WĂƚƚŚĞh ?ƐĚŝƐƉŽƐĂů which have 
been characterized as sui generis ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞh ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌĚĞƌ ?10 Declarations are not 
mentioned anywhere in the Treaty and they are not modelled on, for example, similar 
practices in foreign policy by nation states.
11
 Given their lack of enforceability and formal 
                                                             
5
 CFSP Declarations under examination in this article are distinct from the 65 Declarations concerning 
Provisions of the Treaties and Declarations by Member States attached to the Treaty on European 
Union. 
6
 M. E. Smith, ƵƌŽƉĞ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇWŽůŝĐǇ PƚŚĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ(Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
7
 ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? dh P  ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƚŽŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? 
8
 ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ?dh P ‘/ŶŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌǁŽƌůĚ ?ƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶƐŚĂůůƵƉŚŽůĚĂŶĚ promote its values 
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair 
trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, 
as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? 
9
 According to Article 18 (4) TEU, ƚŚĞ,ŝŐŚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŚĂƐĂ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞ-ŚĂƚƚĞĚ ?ƌŽůĞĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞsŝĐĞ
Presidents of the Commission. Hence, the abbreviation HR/VP is used in this article. 
10
 R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 281 (2
nd
 ed., Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
11
 De Baere has referred to Declarations as themselves being sui generis instruments; G. De Baere, 
Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 122 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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status, they are not considered by some of the leading legal texts on the CFSP.
 12
  Van 
Vooren and Wessel have characterizeĚ ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ Ă ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ  ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ?13 
alongside political dialogues with third countries. As such, their emergence has been gradual 
and had evolved from the days of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the predecessor to 
the CFSP. 
Given their informality and emergence through practice, the use of the specific term 
 ‘Declaration ? for the type of instrument under consideration in this article has arisen only 
several yeaƌƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ &^W ?Ɛ ďŝƌƚŚ ?14 As sŽŶēŝŶĂ ŚĂƐ noted, the lack of institutional 
ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨǁŚŽŝƐ ‘ŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ&^WŚĂƐ resulted in at least three types of 
 ‘ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŝƐƐƵĞĚďǇƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵŶĐŝů ŝŶƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƚŚĞPresidency of the 
Council in the name of the EU and by the Presidency alone.
15
 During the period under 
examination (2007-2015) Declarations have become a much more readily recognisable 
feature of the CFSP which permits an analysis over time. 
The responsibility for issuing Declarations has been changed following the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2011. Currently, Article 18(2) TEU states that the HR/VP is 
responsible for the conduct of the CFSP, and thus has taken over from the Council 
Presidency for the initiation of Declarations.
16
 However, given the special provisions 
applicable to the CFSP which underline the intergovernmental characteristics of the Policy, a 
Declaration is only issued after consultation with Member States since they are issued in the 
name of the EU and its Member States.  
/ŶƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƌƵůĞƐŽƌŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ,Z ?sW ?Ɛannual reports on the CFSP 
give some clarity as to the current practice of issuing public statements and declarations. 
Declarations by the HR/VP on behalf of the EU  W which are the focus of this article  W  ‘ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ
ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhĂŶĚĂƌĞŝƐƐƵĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ,ŝŐŚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽrity with 
prior consultation of the Member States. Where no such official position exists, these 
ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ďǇ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?17 In addition, the High 
ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĂůƐŽŝƐƐƵĞƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ‘ƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĞǀĞŶƚƐƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƋƵŝck EU reaction and 
ŝƐƐƵĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ,Z ?sW ?Ɛ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĨŽƌŵĂů ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?18 
dŚĞ,Z ?sW ?ƐƐƉŽŬĞƐƉĞƌƐŽŶŝƐĂůƐŽĞŵƉŽǁĞƌĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞstatements,  ‘ĨŽƌƋƵŝĐŬhƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ
cases when the personal involvement of the HR/VP is not necesƐĂƌŝůǇ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ? ?19 Finally, 
                                                             
12
 See, for example, P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, (2
nd
 ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2011) or P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (2
nd
 ed., Hart Publishing, 2015).  
13
 B. Van Vooren & R. A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law, 381-382 (Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
14
 Regelsberger and Wessels, in an earlier analysis of foreign policy statements, chart the increase 
from the advent of EPC in 1970 (when non were issued) to 2002 (almost 200). However, this differs 
from the analysis here since it takes into account all statements from the EU, rather those from the 
Council in the name of the Member States collectively: E. Regelserger & W. Wessels, The Evolution of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy: a Case of an Imperfect Ratchet Fusion, in Institutional and 
Policy-making Challenges to the EU in the Wake of Enlargement, 91-116 (ed. A. Verdun & O. Croci, 
Manchester University Press, 2004). 
15
 T. Vonēina, ^ƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ KŶĞ sŽŝĐĞ P ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ ĂŶ /ŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 16(2) European For. Affairs Rev., 169-186, 172 (2011). 
16
  ‘The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall 
contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated 
ďǇƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ?dŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŚĂůůĂƉƉůǇƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? 
17
 Council of the European Union, Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament 2014, 11083/15, 288 (20 Jul. 2015). 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
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 ‘lŽĐĂů ?hƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ ‘ƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐůŽĐĂů ?ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐƐƵĞ ?20 and do not 
appear to involve the HR/VP personally, or the Member States. To this should be added 
démarches which are communicated to third country governments but which are 
confidential.
21
  
Declarations therefore require the input, and the agreement, of the Member States 
before they can be issued. For some Declarations, this process is uncontroversial. But there 
are likely to be more intense negotiations when the issue in question relates to matters 
which lie at the core of state sovereignty, or where there is no pre-existing policy. All this 
takes places in a fast-moving context, since Declarations are (generally) issued in response to 
world events. The COREU network is the usual means by which secure information is passed 
between Member States and has contributed to the development of frequent contacts and 
information sharing between national governments and the EU institutions.
22
 Where there is 
difficulty in gaining agreement between the Member States  W either on whether a 
Declaration should be issued at all, or what it should say  W the final text may be worded in 
very general terms or may not appear at all. There is no guarantee therefore that a 
Declaration will necessarily be issued, even if the EU has done so before on a similar issue 
regarding another country. Very occasionally, a Declaration is issued jointly with another, 
non-EU organization, such as the Council of Europe.
23
 
Once a Declaration is agreed by the Member States, selected third states  W 14 in 
total  W are invited to align themselves with the Declaration. These states are candidates or 
potential candidates for EU membership,
24
 EEA/EFTA states,
25
 and selected states within the 
h ?Ɛ ĂƐƚĞƌŶ Partnership/European Neighbourhood Policy in Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus.
26
 If they express their wish to align themselves, these states are added to the text 
of the Declaration to signal their public agreement with the text of the Declaration. Some 
Declarations are specifically used to identify which of these third states have aligned their 
legal systems with restrictive measures (sanctions) regimes put in place by the EU.
27
 Once 
finalized the alignment of the third stations, Declarations are placed in the (publicly 
available) press releases section of the website of the Council.
28
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This article examines the 708 Declarations which were issued by the High Representative (or 
Council, prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2011) over a nine-year period 
between 2007 and 2015. 2007 was chosen as a start date since earlier practices in the 2000s  
                                                             
20
 Ibid. 
21
 U. Khaliq, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
22
 F. Bicchi, The EU as a community of practice, in The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: the 
Quest for Democracy (ed. H. Sjursen, Routledge, 2012). 
23
 See, for example, Joint Declaration by the European Union High Representative Federica Mogherini, 
on behalf of the EU, and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, on the 
European and World Day against the Death Penalty, 707/15, (9 Oct. 2015). 
24
 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland (though it has 
since withdrawn its membership application), Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey. Croatia was invited third 
country as a candidate and then accession state for the period under examination in this article from 
2007 until its EU accession in July 2013. 
25
 Iceland (which was also a candidate state until it withdrew its application), Norway and 
Liechtenstein. 
26
 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
27
 See P. J. Cardwell, The Legalisation of European Union Foreign Policy and the Use of Sanctions, 17(1) 
Cambridge Y.B. European Leg. Stud., 287-310 (2015). 
28
 See, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/>, (3 Feb. 2016). 
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ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ĞƚĐ Žƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ
institutions were responsible for issuing them. By 2007 the practice of primarily using 
Declarations to signify a text which has been agreed by the Member States was more firmly 
established. This has continued in the post-Lisbon Treaty, which (as set out above) led to a 
more coherent practice from the HR/VP in terms of delineating Declarations (which involve 
the Member States) and statements (which do not). Beginning in 2007, it is therefore 
possible to analyse Declarations alone, whilst recognizing that these are not the only way in 
which the EU may express a foreign policy view. For the analysis in each of the following 
sections, each individual Declaration has been classified according to three criteria. Part IV 
breaks down the Declarations into five types according to their purpose. Part V categorizes 
according to geographical spread and countries to which they are addressed. Finally, Part VI 
classifies each of the Declarations according to the values expressed in them. The data is 
presented in graph form to illustrate where trends can be detected. 
4. FREQUENCY AND TYPES OF DECLARATION 
To understand the diversity in the content of the Declarations, they have been categorized 
into five distinct types. 
100 Declarations are classified as  ‘support ĨŽƌ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? These include 
the support expressed by the EU for institutions or international law or agreements. They 
are often issued on designated days (e.g. International Human Rights Day), for individuals 
appointed to key UN posts or for developments such as the proceedings in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).
29
 /ƚŝƐƵƐƵĂůĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĨŽƌ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘^ƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƵƉĨŽƌ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁŝƐƚŚĞƐŝůǀĞƌƚŚƌĞĂĚ
ƚŚĂƚƌƵŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚhĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?30 These Declarations can appear rather anodyne, 
since they are not addressed to any third state in particular (though they could be applied to 
a regional initiatives)
31
 and their content is usually uncontroversial. However, they can 
include direct criticism of third states, for example, in the Declaration on the European and 
World Day against the Death Penalty, which singles out Belarus.
32
 
The  ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ? type covers 136 Declarations which commend a third state for a 
particular action. For example, these occur when a third state has improved democratic 
processes,
33
 upon the resolution of internal strife or a moratorium or abolition of the death 
penalty. This category of Declaration is unlikely to cause any major diplomatic tensions and 
are likely to be agreed by the Member States relatively easily. 
 ‘>ŝŵŝƚĞĚ Žƌ ŵŝǆĞĚ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐrepresent a half-way house between 
complimentary and critical. These Declarations, of which there are 94 in total, usually 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƐŝŶĂƚŚŝƌĚƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŽƌŽǀĞƌĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?,ŽǁĞver, they stop 
short of strong criticism or condemnation, even though this may be implied by the fact that 
a Declaration is a public statement. For example, a 2015 Declaration on Rwanda warned 
against an envisaged constitutional reform without overtly criticising.
34
 Similarly, this type of 
                                                             
29
 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union following the start of the Thomas 
Lubanga trial at the ICC in January 2009, 5850/09, (28 Jan. 2009). 
30
 Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on Human 
Rights Day, 17549/1/12 REV 1, (10 Dec. 2012). 
31
 Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on 
Feminicide (Latin America) (2010), 11706/1/10, (30 Jun. 2010). 
32
 Supra, n. 23. 
33
 For example, Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union 
on the approval of a new Constitution in Kenya (2010), 12785/10 (2010). 
34
 Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU on constitutional 
review in Rwanda (2015), 892/15, (3 Dec. 2015). 
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Declaration may compliment a third country (e.g. on holding relatively free and fair 
elections) moving towards democratization but noting where there are shortcomings or 
further democratic progress to be made.
35
  
 ‘^ƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? are the most common type of Declarations overall. The 214 in this 
category strongly criticize or condemn a third state for actions including human rights 
abuses, threatening behaviour towards its population or neighbouring states or the 
unauthorized testing of weapons. A Declaration included in this type will generally use 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐƵĐŚ ‘ƚŚĞhĐŽŶĚĞŵŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƐƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚƵƌŐĞƐ ? ? ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ
strongest kind of language employed by the EU towards a third state. country in question. 
Finally,  ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? Declarations (164 in total) are those which give notice 
of the alignment of third states (listed in the previous section) with a CFSP Decision (or, pre-
Lisbon, a Common Position) on the imposition of restrictive measures (sanctions) against a 
state, a breakaway region of a state or individuals. As of January 2016, there are over 30 
restrictive measures regimes in place towards states in all parts of the world, and two 
regimes which target individuals suspect of terrorism and their assets. Alignment requires 
both domestic legal and policy changes. Such changes to put in place might include the 
freezing of assets, limitation of trade or imposing a travel ban on officials. Some restrictive 
measures are based on sanctions agreed by the United Nations Security Council, others are 
derived from autonomous EU measures.
36
 
Figure 1 covers all the Declarations issued over the nine-period under examination. 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown per year for each type of Declaration, and also shows the 
total number of Declarations issued annually. 
100
136
94
214
164
Figure 1: Total number of Declarations by Type
Support for international 
institutions
Complimentary
Limited or mixed criticism
Strongly critical
Third-country sanctions
 
                                                             
35
 A good example of this combined approach is: Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the 
presidential elections in Egypt (2014), 10649/1/14 REV 1, (5 Jun. 2014). 
36
 C. Beaucillon, Comment choisir ses mesures restrictives, EUISS Occasional Paper 100 (Brussels, 2013). 
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From this data, three trends can be drawn out. First, it can be seen that there is a 
relatively even split between the different types of Declarations. Declarations are not 
therefore used to exclusively criticize or compliment, nor are they simply a tool which are 
used to issue uncontroversial, expected views (of those generally found within ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ĨŽƌ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚǇƉĞ). This typology reveals that the Declarations are not 
ŵĞƌĞůǇƵƐĞĚŝŶĂƌŽƵƚŝŶĞĨĂƐŚŝŽŶƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƵŶĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůŽƌ ‘ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ǀŝĞǁƐ ?/ĨƚŚŝƐǁĞƌĞ
so, we would expect far more in the first two categories than is suggested by the evidence. It 
is also a reasonable assumption that issuing a Declaration which is more critical in tone 
implies a much greater level of caution on the part of the Member States than a 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ?ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?and hence a much greater level of interaction between the EU 
institutions and the Member States. We can see from this data that there is a high 
proportion of  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƌŵŝǆĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?and (especially)  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? Declarations. This 
strongly indicates not only the agreement between the actors but also the existence of a 
dense institutional network and familiarity between them which allows the Declaration to 
be drafted, agreed and issued in such a short period of time. 
 Second, the overall number of Declarations has declined from a peak in 2008. But 
the number of Declarations of each type has shifted over time.  ‘dŚŝƌĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
Declarations in particular have occupied a far greater proportion of the Declarations issued 
in the final years of the period under scrutiny. This trend can be explained by the 
institutional changes to ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ&^WŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ upon the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The frequency and ƚǇƉĞŽĨĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƐƵĞĚŝƐĂůƐŽŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
 8 
institutional coherence. Ensuring institutional coherence in external relations was one of the 
dominant themes in the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, with 
particular focus on the High Representative (or Union Minister, as was foreseen in the 
Constitutional Treaty).
37
 
The assumption of responsibility for the process by the High Representative caused 
a sharp decline in the number of Declarations issued in the name of the HR/VP and the 
Member States. Whilst this might indicate that the EU has not managed to agree on foreign 
policy issues, or that Declarations are no longer seen as necessary or useful, the argument 
made here is rather to the contrary. This is due to the overall number of statements issued 
by the two post-Lisbon HR/VP (Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini) and their 
spokespersons has increased rapidly.
38
 In 2013 and 2014 there were 252 and 173 statements 
issued by the HR/VP, plus 201 and 235 by the spokespersons.
39
 In 2010, there were a total of 
149 HR/VP statements and 80 from these spokespersons.
40
 Whilst this means that  W in 
strictly numerical terms  W Declarations under examination here have become rather more 
the exception than the rule, the overall context is one where the EU has more, not less, to 
say through the CFSP. 
The high number of category  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƌŵŝǆĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?type 
Declarations issued since the High Representative took over their coordination can be seen 
ĂƐ Ă ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ďĞŝŶŐ ŵŽƌĞ ǀŽĐĂů ĂďŽƵƚ
expressing the h ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞƐ when they are under threat elsewhere in the world. This 
responds positively ƚŽsŽŶēŝŶĂ ?ƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽĨŽƌĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝƐďŽŶ
dƌĞĂƚǇĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĐƚƵĂůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?41 Compared 
to the period prior to 2011 when the Council Presidency issued Declarations, there is less 
variation in institutional responsibility. This supports an analysis that having a more regular 
 ‘ĨĂĐĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ&^Wallows the Declarations to be developed as a specific type of instrument 
within the CFSP and avoids the possibility that a single Member State holding the Presidency 
ǁŝůůďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? 
 The decline since 2011 in the use of Declarations in favour of statements issued by 
the HR/VP alone suggests that Declarations have become reserved for special cases. Most of 
the Declarations from 2013, 2014 and 2015 have been  ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚǇƉĞ
Declarations. These could not be done by HR/VP statements. The remaining Declarations are 
evenly split between all the other types. They are not reserved only for the most critical 
cases. Since Declarations require coordination, cooperation and potentially negotiation 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĨŽƌŵĂŶ ‘ĂĐƋƵŝƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ,Z ?sW
can then use as a basis for subsequent statements, without the need to do so in cooperation 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?KŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚĂƚŚŝƌĚ
                                                             
37
 See, inter alia, S. Blockmans & M-L Laatsit, The European External Action Service: Ensuring 
Coherence in EU External Action?, in EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, 135-
159 (ed. P.J. Cardwell, Asser Press, 2012); C. Hillion, Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the 
external relations of the European Union, in Developments in EU External Relations Law, 10-36 (ed. M. 
Cremona, Oxford University Press, 2008); L. den Hertog & S. ^ƚƌŽɴ, Coherence in EU External Relations: 
Concepts and Legal Rooting of an Ambiguous Term, 18(3) European For. Affairs Rev., 373 W388 (2013). 
38
 Data from before 2010 is not included in the annual CFSP reports. 
39
 Council of the European Union, Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament 2013, 12094/14, (23 Jul. 2014); and 
Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy to the European Parliament 2014, 11083/15, (20 Jul. 2015). 
40
 Council of the European Union, Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament 2010, 12562/11, (6 Jul. 2011). 
41
 sŽŶēŝŶĂsupra n. 15, 186. 
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country can be more easily ascertained from the issuance of Declarations. On the other 
hand, the High Representative can be seen to have a greater sense of legitimacy to 
represent the Union (and by analogy the Member States) and issue statements of her own 
accord, without the need to worry that every single statement must first be considered by 
the Member States. Recalling that the ability to act quickly has been one of the main 
criticisms of the EU and the CFSP, this practice would seem to confront this perceived 
drawback. 
Third, the high number of third country sanctions Declarations, which are only 
issued if some of the invited third countries align themselves, demonstrates that the 
instances of EU-led restrictive measures has increased and have been supported by non-EU 
Member States too. In fact, the frequency of alignment by the third states to Declarations 
has been high, with at least seven of the 14 invited states doing so on each occasion, and 
usually around ten.
42
 Some of the 14 non-EU states align themselves almost without 
exception. Albania, for example, has not missed an opportunity to do so since 2011. States 
which are part of the enlargement process tend to have a higher rate of alignment, with the 
exception of Turkey, which has not aligned itself with most of the Declarations on restrictive 
measures. This has been pointed out in the enlargement reports on Turkish progress 
towards full membership.
43
 It could suggest an indirect link between CFSP activity and 
alignment of the acquis required for membership. Nevertheless, Norway and Liechtenstein  W 
which are not part of the enlargement process  W have the highest rates of alignment behind 
Albania and Montenegro. For the countries of the Eastern Partnership, Moldova and 
hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?ƐĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚŝƐŵƵĐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƌŵĞŶŝĂĂŶĚ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ ?ǁŝƚŚǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇ
country to align itself very rarely. ƐĂƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞh ?Ɛ&^W
Declarations, it can be understood as a successful one, based on the general rate of 
alignment across all the third countries. The increase in the number of  ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? Declarations, which are specifically for the purpose of alignment of third countries 
with restrictive measures put in place by EU law, demonstrates not only that sanctions are 
increasingly prevalent as a tool of EU foreign policy but that the Declarations are used to 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞhŝƐ ‘ĚŽŝŶŐ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌs to do something too). The 
analysis runs counter to a view that Declarations are merely words and nothing more. 
 ? ?'K'ZW,/^WZK&d, ‘dZ'd^ ?K&>Zd/KE^ 
The previous section demonstrated that Declarations are a stable and regular feature of the 
CFSP, and used for a variety of purposes in foreign policy. In this section, the Declarations 
ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ? ƐƚĂƚĞ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŝĨ
Declarations are particularly used towards certain states or regions. Declarations are public 
proclamations and are therefore not addressed ƚŽ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ? ŝƐ
usually the government of a third state, but is sometimes a faction or breakaway 
region/unrecognized government (e.g. South Ossetia in Georgia). Figure 3 shows how the 
five different types of Declaration have been used towards five regions.
 44
 
                                                             
42
 The additional datĂ ŽŶ ĞĂĐŚ ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĞĂĐŚ ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
included here, due to limitations of space. However, see Cardwell, supra n. 24. 
43
 dŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ŽŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ  ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĂůŝŐŶ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŵŽƌĞ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ
wŝƚŚ h ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƵŶĐŝů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŝŶŐ ǇĞĂƌ ?
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_turkey.pdf>, p. 81, 
(3 Feb. 2016). 
44
 The non-ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĨŽĐƵƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŽŶůǇƐŽŵĞŽĨ ‘ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚǇƉĞ
(such those which commemorate particular internationally recognizeĚĚĂǇƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? &Žƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚer, these are alignment with the restrictive measures 
regimes against suspected terrorists (ie. the Kadi situation) and their assets, who may be situated 
anywhere in the world. Declarations which support an international day particular to a region (e.g. 
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The geographical breakdown of the addressee countries of Declarations in Figure 3 
reveals that over the course of the nine-year period under examination, they have been 
relatively evenly applied to countries across the globe. This also applies when they are 
divided by type. 
The numbers of Declaration for each region show that Sub-Saharan Africa (179) and 
Asia and the Pacific (203) are the most common geographical regions to be the subject of 
Declarations. However, they are also much larger in area  W and with a much greater number 
of countries  W than the other regions. The number of Declarations which cover states close 
to the EU borders, in Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East is relatively low. 
Russia and Belarus account for 63% of the critical and sanctions Declarations in the Eastern 
Europe category, and Syria for 45% in the Middle East/North Africa category. Neither critical 
nor complimentary Declarations are a common tool towards ƚŚŝƌĚƐƚĂƚĞƐĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
borders, in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe or North Africa. Since third states in the 
Western Balkans and Eastern Europe are invited to align with Declarations, and are involved 
in deep engagement with the EU, a Declaration (particularly a strongly critical one) would be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
ASEAN) and where restrictive measures apply to a specific country have been included in their 
respective regions in the table. 
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a significant step to take because it would risk threatening neighbourly, political relations. 
The exceptions are for states including Belarus and, since 2013, Russia. Both Belarus and 
Russia are the subject of restrictive measures regimes by the EU, which explain a high 
number of third country sanctions Declarations too. 
The high number of Declarations towards Sub-Saharan Africa indicates a very mixed 
use of Declarations  W they are readily used to both compliment third countries in this region, 
and to criticize. This can be contrasted with Asia, where  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇcritical ?ƚype Declarations 
are more widely used, though this region is the only one where there is an overall lack of 
balance between  ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?. The addressee countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa are part of the EU-ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) partnership  W the Cotonou 
Agreement  W which includes essential elements regarding human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law,
45
 mirroring ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ dƌĞĂƚǇ-based obligations.46 Most 
countries in Asia which are addressees of Declarations do not have a deep relationship with 
the EU. This suggests that the EU is more willing to compliment states with which it has a 
stronger relationship, rather than only criticize. However, in order to test this further, a 
country-by-country breakdown across the globe is also useful to complete the geographical 
picture. The countries in Figure 4 are the most frequently targeted (with more than 10 
instances) by Declarations, of any type. 
                                                             
45
 Article 9, Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States, and the European Community and its Member States (2000), O.J. L 287 (4 Nov. 2010) 
(revised version). 
46
 These are explored in more detail in Part VI. 
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All the countries in Figure 4 are subject to restrictive measures (sanctions) regimes, 
with the exception of China, Israel and the USA. Thus, all these countries are the addressees 
ŽĨ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? Declarations (some or all of the invited third countries join the 
EU in supporting the restrictive measures), but not exclusively so. It is always the case that 
they will be joined by separate  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? Declarations too. Rarely are these countries 
the focus of  ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ? Žƌ ĞǀĞŶ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ Žƌ ŵŝǆĞĚ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? Declarations, with the 
ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƀƚĞĚ ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨeither type of critical Declaration. 
 For some countries on the list, the subject matter is limited. For the US, the 
Declarations only concern the use of the death penalty, with  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇcritical ? Declarations 
when it has been used (in controversial circumstances) and  ‘complimentary ? Declarations 
issued when a state has abolished its use (such as Maryland in 2013).
47
 Declarations about 
Russia are almost exclusively related to criticisms of its activities in neighbouring or 
breakaway states, and since 2011, the restrictive measures placed due to  W according to the 
Declaration  W  ‘ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůizing ? ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ in Ukraine.48 On the other hand, Declarations 
addressed to Belarus, Syria, Iran and Burma/Myanmar are almost exclusively of ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ
                                                             
47
 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the 
abolition of the death penalty in Maryland, USA (2013), 9212/2/13 REV 2, (2 May 2013). 
48
 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries 
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (2015), 
794/15, (10 Nov. 2015). 
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ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? ƚǇƉĞ. This reveals that the approach to these countries has been repeated use of 
critical Declarations which combine with restrictive measures. 
By contrast, Declarations concerning Guinea, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Zimbabwe are generally more varied in type. These countries therefore typify the 
practice with states in Sub-Saharan Africa: Declarations which are complimentary are as 
readily issued as Declarations which are critical, even where restrictive measures regimes 
are in place. For states in North Africa and the Middle East, the EU has issued few 
complimentary Declarations of and far more of ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ Žƌ ŵŝǆĞĚ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ƚǇƉĞ. The 
evidence suggests that the practice of Declarations is affected by questions of geography, 
with states closer to the EU being far more often the addressees of critical Declarations than 
complimentary ones. With states further from the EU, in Africa, the Americas and Asia, a 
much more mixed picture emerges, with Declarations used a tool to compliment as well as 
criticize. The frequency of such countries is discussed in more detail in the following section, 
however, there are patterns which emerge in the type of Declaration used for certain 
countries. The continued use of Declarations towards certain countries more frequently 
suggests that once a critical Declaration has been made regarding a country, it becomes 
more likely that this instrument will be used again. As such, Declarations can be seen to form 
a part of a coherent strategy towards a third country. Similarly, the lack of critical 
Declarations towards countries which nevertheless have engaged in behaviour that the EU 
has criticized in other states demonstrates either that (a) there is no agreement between 
Member States which prevents a Declaration from being issued or (b) that Declarations are 
not seen as the appropriate tool. Whichever, both demonstrate that the Declarations are an 
institutionalized form of cooperation and are not simply issued haphazardly. 
6. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF DECLARATIONS 
The final part of the analysis examines more closely the subject-matter of the Declaration. 
dŚĞ&^WĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŽĨƚĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐ ? as detailed in Articles 2 
and 3(5) TEU, providing an outward legitimacy or justification to issue a Declaration 
(particularly Ă  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? ŽŶĞ). Categorizing the Declarations according to which of 
these values they relate to is a difficult task, which does not necessarily permit a worthwhile 
analysis. For example, a Declaration which criticizes an undemocratic election in a third 
country relates to potentially all of the values listed in Article 2 TEU. It is difficult to isolate 
ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞůĂƚĞ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚƌŝĐƚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ? ĂƐ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ? ? dh since this might cover territorial disputes, 
human rights protection and election and other democratic processes.  
In order to better understand the substantive issues which Declarations have been 
used to highlight in third countries or internationally, a more thematic analysis is needed. 
The Declarations have been grouped according to the following major subjects. Restrictive 
measures (and the third countries aligning themselves) are covered exclusively by ƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚǇƉĞ, though the rationale behind the sanctions may be referred to in 
other Declarations.
49
 Freedom of the press/media and the death penalty are the most 
common, specific matters to which Declarations have been addressed, and therefore are 
categorized separately. The categories of human rights and democracy are, in a sense, two 
sides of the same coin. To help distinguish them here they have been divided into two 
categories. Declarations included within the Democracy category are where the Declaration 
concerns the respect for national law and democratic processes (except elections), including 
                                                             
49
 For example, on Burma/Myanmar: Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on the verdict against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (2009), 12628/1/09 REV 1, (12 Aug. 2009). 
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appeals for the release of detained individuals such as political opponents or activists.
50
 
Human rights are those instances which specifically mention the protection/respect for 
human rights, within a country
51
 or more globally  ?Ğ ?Ő ?ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?52 
 
All the Declarations can be seen to relate ƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇ ?dŚĞ
figures reveal, however, that more specific values feature prominently in the Declarations 
and the topic to some extent explains differences between the three complimentary and 
critical-type Declarations in particular. For instance, the EU appears to issue a 
complimentary-type Declaration far more readily for a successful election process than to 
strongly criticize. The opposite appears to be true in cases where conflict is occurring, or 
threatening to occur. 
What the analysis reveals, nevertheless, is that there is a relatively even spread 
between the main issues on which a Declaration may appear. Democracy and human rights 
Declarations are by far the most common, more so than the traditional foreign policy 
domains of territorial issues, conflict or perhaps restrictive measures. Since the nature of 
Declarations are a rapid reaction to an event or a change (with the exception of the annual 
support given to international commemorative days), we cannot assume from this 
                                                             
50
 For example, on Bahrain: Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the 
European Union concerning the situation of Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja (2012), 8822/1/12 REV 1, (17 Apr. 
2012). 
51
 For example, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union concerning 
the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act (2014), 7267/1/14 REV 1, (4 Mar. 2014). 
52
 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the 
occasion of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples (2013), 13019/1/13 REV 1, (9 Aug. 
2013). 
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ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ h  ‘ĐĂƌĞƐ ? ŵŽƌĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂŶ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? tŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƐĞĞ ?
however, is that two topics in particular stand out in terms of the numbers of Declarations 
issues, and these merit further attention: elections and the death penalty. 
 Declarations concerning the conduct of elections are, behind restrictive measures, 
the most common subject. There is also a readiness to congratulate a third country for 
successful election process, including referenda. They are particularly used in instances 
where a country has made (or is in the process of making) a recent transition to 
democracy,
53
 or when democratic elections are held against the background of recent 
violence. The relatively high number of  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƌŵŝǆĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐiƐŵ ? Declarations are typically 
accounted for when an election has generally been seen as democratic but that there is still 
work to be done.  ‘^ƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? Declarations address an undemocratic election process, 
or where the elections themselves are not seen by the EU or the international community as 
legitimate (for example, in an unrecognized or occupied province). The high number of 
complimentary Declarations, and the overall frequency of Declarations addressed to 
election processes is explained by the nature of elections as regular events. Many of the 
election processes under scrutiny will have been observed by the EU itself, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or other international organizations such as 
the African Union.
54
 The evidence provided by these reports, as well as a relatively clear set 
of criteria to judge whether an election is free and fair, means that there is an objective 
standard to measure against. Hence, issuing a Declaration should be relatively 
straightforward. 
Some of this reasoning also applies to the Declarations concerning the death 
penalty. Since the opposition to the death penalty is a readily identifiable and distinct EU 
value, with agreed Common guidelines,
55
 it is unsurprising that numerous Declarations on 
the topic have been issued. These include  ‘ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? (for World 
Day against the Death Penalty),
56
  ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ?, where a state has issued a moratorium 
on the use of the death penalty, or abolished it altogether,
57
 and  W most frequently  W 
 ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? when the death penalty has been restored or applied to new crimes,58 or 
used in spite of doubts over due process (such as when a moratorium has been in place for a 
considerable period of time).
59
 Declarations are issued either as a means to attempt to 
prevent an imminent execution or after the event has occurred.  
The number of Declarations issued, whilst high up the list of subject-matter, 
nevertheless indicates that they are not issued on every instance of the use of the death 
penalty around the world. The most striking thing about the use of  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? 
Declarations is the countries to which they are addressed  W and which they are not. 
Countries which have the some of the closest, strongest relationships with the EU, including 
                                                             
53
 For example: Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union 
on the final results of the elections in Angola (2012), 14095/2/12 REV 2, (24 Sep. 2012). 
54
 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union 
following presidential elections in Zimbabwe (2013), 13092/13, (22 Aug. 2013). 
55
 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, 8416/13 (2013), 
at:<http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/death_penalty/docs/guidelines_death_penalty_
st08416_en.pdf>, (3 Feb. 2016). 
56
 Supra n. 21. 
57
 For example, Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European 
Union on the occasion of the decision of the Ethiopian President to uphold the moratorium on the 
death penalty (2011), 12311/1/11, (30 Jun. 2011). 
58
 For example, Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union 
on the reintroduction of the death penalty in Papua New Guinea, 10477/1/13 REV 1, (3 Jun. 2013). 
59
 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the EU on the execution of 
Mr Jackson in Delaware, USA (2011), 13368/2/11 REV 2, (2 Aug. 2011). 
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USA and Japan are often the subject of critical Declarations.
60
 Only Iran has been the subject 
of more  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? Declarations on the death penalty (21, out 41 of this type in total 
concerning Iran). Yet other countries which carry out the most executions per year
61
  W China, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Sudan  W have seldom been the focus of Declarations. Therefore, 
whilst the frequency of Declarations on the death penalty reinforces the promotion of 
abolition as a European value, public CFSP Declarations are not necessarily seen as a 
desirable method to so by the High Representative or the Council. This differentiated 
approach can be criticized for not using the same techniques to condemn third countries for 
the use of the death penalty, and demonstrates the limits to a value-led foreign policy when 
other interests (such as commercial ones) are at stake, or where collective decision-making 
may be prevented by one or more Member States does not agree with a Declaration.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of CFSP Declarations here demonstrates that they have become an important 
feature of the CFSP and offer a rich insight into the way in which European foreign policy 
works. Declarations have become more regular, not just in terms of frequency but in terms 
of subject matter. They have been applied to countries across the globe and have a close 
ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƉĂŝĚƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
death penalty and the freedom of the press. The mix of complimentary and critical 
ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝƐ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĂŐƌĞĞ ƉƵďůŝĐůǇ ŽŶ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĨŽƌ
foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, it is not suggested by the evidence that Declarations are 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐŽ ƚŽ ? ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ? ĞǀĞŶ ǁŚĞƌĞ ŶŽ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ  ‘ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞ
measures) are planned. The example of the lack of criticism of certain countries which 
regularly use the death penalty is a case in point. As such, Declarations should be seen as a 
particular type of  ‘ƚŽŽů ?Žƌ ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨhĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ which are appropriate in some 
but not all circumstances. In this respect, Declarations work in much the same way as other 
tools of foreign policy  W or indeed in any policy area  W since they may or may not be the best 
response to a situation given the circumstances and wider context. 
dŚĞ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ďǇ ŵĂŶǇ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
neighbourhood upon invitation underlines a claim that the EU is taking a more coherent 
approach to foreign policy than it has in the past. One might continue to criticize the fact 
that Declarations remain  W in the most part  W words on paper and therefore leave the EU 
open to criticism that it is not capable of anything more. However, the regularity of critical 
Declarations applied to such a wide range of countries or issues tells us at the very least that 
the EU has made considerable progress towards achieving a common foreign and security 
policy. 
Whilst the number of Declarations has declined sharply since the transfer of 
responsibility to the HR/VP, the evidence suggests that this tendency should not be seen as 
the EU/Council having nothing to say or no position which can be agreed between the 
Member States. Rather, the increasing number of overall statements from the HR/VP of her 
own accord suggests a high level of delegation on foreign policy matters from the Member 
States and a familiarity with (to return to the point made above) the appropriateness of the 
use of Declarations as a foreign policy tool. The relative appropriateness is particularly 
significant in cases where Declarations or statements are strongly critical of third countries. 
Moreover, the extremely wide range of third states and issues to which Declarations have 
been addressed during the period 2007-2011 (i.e. before the change in institutional role for 
                                                             
60
 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on 
executions in Japan (2012), 8392/12, (29 Mar. 2012). 
61
 Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions 2014, (2015) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/0001/2015/en/ >, (3 Feb. 2016). 
 17 
the HR/VP) ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƚŽĂŶh&^W ‘acquis ?  W a set 
of institutionalized rules and practices which tells us what CFSP is and when and why it is 
used. In turn, ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘acquis ? allows the HR/VP to more fully claim to 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŽ ůŝŶŬ ƚŽ
previous Declarations as discussed with the Member States. All the Declarations relate to 
ƚŚĞh ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ its values in the wider world. The analysis 
has demonstrated that there has been progress in carving out particular values to express 
via CFSP Declarations. There is an opportunity for further research to investigate the links 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ?ĂƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚǀŝĂƚŚĞĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŽŽůƐĂƚƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
disposal in foreign policy to evaluate what effects  W in the short and long-term  W these might 
have on third countries and in the international community. 
 
 
 
 
 
